Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 10

Issue 3

Article 8

1959

Civil Procedure
Samuel Sonenfield

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Samuel Sonenfield, Civil Procedure, 10 Wes. Rsrv. L. Rev. 347 (1959)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol10/iss3/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an
authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

1959]

SURVEY OF OHIO LAW -

1958

attorneys and judges. The court, relying on the Legislature as well
as -its own inherent power, referred to the statutes making admittance to
practice and a certain period of active practice as a prerequisite to service as a judge in the various courts of Ohio," and concluded that:
... An attorney at law does not, upon assuming a judicial position, cease
to be a member of the legal profession, but becomes such a member who
has assumed a position of public trust which demands of him an even
greater degree of responsibility and an even higher and more specialized
standard of conduct than that demanded of a practicing attorney...

It suspended respondent indefinitely from practicing as an attorney,
ordered his name be stricken from the Journal and Roll of Attorneys
maintained by the Clerk of the Supreme Court and restrained him from
the practice of Law in Ohio in any way or form whatsoever. Its action
in this case did not, of course, specifically oust him from the judicial
office.
Contempt for Failureto Fully Report Full Fee
In Wrongful Death Case
In a case'a arising not out of disciplinary procedures as now set forth
in Rules XXVII and XXVIII, but rather on appeal from a conviction
of contempt charges filed against the offending attorney by the judge
of a probate court in which the incident occurred, the Supreme Court
held that it is an act of contempt for an attorney to file with the court
a statement that he had received from the distributees of the proceeds
of a wrongful death claim an attorney fee of $525.00, when he had in

fact received from such beneficiaries an additional sum of $450.00. The
court did not find it necessary to consider the alleged invalidity of a rule
of the particular probate court limiting the amount of such fees, since
the attorney had not seasonably raised that point.
SAMUEL SONENFELD

CIVIL PROCEDURE
Jurisdiction in Prohibition
The action of prohibition is an ancient and useful common law
remedy whereby a superior court prevents an inferior court or judge from
exercising jurisdiction over subject matter when the inferior lacks the
11. Oio REv. CODE 5 2503.01, 2501.02, 2301.01, 2101.02, 1901.06, 1907.051.
12. Mahoning County Bar Assn v. Franko, 168 Ohio St. 17, 24, 151 N.E.2d 17,
23 (1958).
13. I re La Penta's Estate, 167 Ohio St. 536, 150 N.E.2d 404 (1958).
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jurisdiction which it is about to assume or has assumed.' While the Ohio
Constitution specifically confers upon the Ohio Supreme Court and the
courts of appeals original jurisdiction in prohibition, it does not do so
specifically to courts of common pleas. 2 It is undisputed that these courts
are merely given the "capacity to receive jurisdiction" in civil and criminal cases, when the legislature acts to bestow it.3
The question whether the legislature has ever acted was before the
Supreme Court in State ex rel. Miller v. Keefe, Jadge,4 in which the Common Pleas Court of Hamilton County had purported to issue such a writ
to the Municipal Court of Cincinnati. The Supreme Court pointed out
that while the legislature has specifically granted original jurisdiction to
common pleas in habeas corpus and mandamus, 5 it has not done so in
prohibtion, quo warranto or procedendo. Likewise, it pointed out that
the section of the Revised Code6 which confers on the court of common
pleas "original jurisdiction in all civil cases where the sum or matter in
dispute exceeds the original jurisdiction of justices of peace" has not been
in the past construed to include proceedings in mandamus, and concluded
7
that it does not embrace proceedings in prohibition.
Chief Judge Weygandt dissented, pointing out that the court had in
past decisions8 tacitly assumed that common pleas had a general jurisdiction over all matters of law and equity which are not denied to it.
The majority opinion specifically did not pass upon the question
whether a common pleas court might have jurisdiction in a case in which
jurisdiction had already been conferred on it and an attempt was being
made by an inferior tribunal to interfere with that jurisdiction.
Such power seems inferentially to have been established by the Court
of Appeals for Summit County in Parkison v. Victor, Judge,9 although
the majority of the court in that case likewise specifically refrained from
so deciding, while Judge Hunsicker, concurring in the specific result
reached, held that a common pleas court could not have such power.
1.
2.

BouvER's LAw DIcTIONARY, 2739 (Rawle's Third Revision).
OHIO CONST., art. IV §§ 2, 6.

3. Id.§4.
4. 168 Ohio St. 234, 152 N.E.2d 113 (1958).
5. OHIO REv. CODE §§ 2725.02, 2731.02. In fact, there seems to be only one
place in the entire Revised Code at which the action of prohibition is even mentioned. See § 2329.70.
6. OHIO REV. CODE § 2305.01.
7. Chin v. Trustees, 32 Ohio St. 236 (1877).
8. Saxton v. Seiberling, 48 Ohio St. 554 (1894), State v. King, 166 Ohio St. 293,
142 N.E.2d 222 (1957).
9. 105 Ohio App. 200, 152 N.E.2d 275 (1957).
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SIMULTANEOUS INJURY TO PERSON AND PROPERTY ONE CAUSE OF ACTION
Problems of Joinder of Parties
A pleading problem with substantive overtones which has long remained unsettled in Ohio came much closer to final solution by the Su-

preme Court in 1958.10 The various states have split on the question
whether the injury by one act to rights in person and in property produces one or two causes of action. The majority seem to favor the rule
that one cause of action results; a respectable minority believe it to result
in two causes. In those which adhere to the majority rule an exception
is made in those instances in which an insurer is subrogated to the injured person's claim for damage to his personality.
Decision of the question is important. If the result is one cause of
action and plaintiff is not insured he must sue defendant for both the
injury to his person and his property in one action or he will by recovery
for the usually much smaller damage to his automobile bar himself from
a recovery for his personal injuries. If the result is two causes of action,
plaintiff and defendant both face dangers. Loss by plaintiff of his small
claim for damage to personal property may nevertheless bar him from
recovery for his personal injuries, while loss of the smaller lawsuit by defendant may put him in the position in the large one of being able to
go to the jury only on the questions of whether in fact the plaintiff received injuries and if so, what the amount of recovery shall be.
The Ohio Supreme Court had previously strongly intimated that the
decision in Ohio would be in accord with the majority." Two other
cases which raised the question were qualified by the fact that a
subrogated insurer was in the picture.' 2 In Rush v. Maple Heights,
the fact situation being uncomplicated by any subrogated insurer, the
court had squarely before it whethw a previous $100.00 recovery by
plaintiff for injuries to personal property as a result of defendant's negligence barred her from recovering judgment from that defendant on a
jury verdict for $12,000.00 for injuries to her person.
The Supreme Court held her barred. She had already reduced her
one cause of action to a judgment in the earlier case.
Still left unsettled are the questions whether the existence of insurance on a part of plaintiff's property damages results in the existence of
10. Rush v. City of Maple Heights, 167 Ohio St 221, 147 N.E.2d 599 (1958);
cert. denied 79 S.Ct.21 (1958). The Ohio Supreme Court's opinion cites numerous
authorities on both sides of this question.
11. Markoa v. East Ohio Gas Company, 154 Ohio St 546, 97 N.E.2d 13 (1951).
12. Mansker v. Dealers' Transport Co., 160 Ohio St. 255, 116 N.E.2d 3 (1953)
and Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc., 145 Ohio St. 321, 61 N.E.2d 707 (1945).
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a separate cause of action for that, or merely a permissive splitting of the
one cause, and some troublesome problems of permissive joinder.
One of these was dealt with in Holibaugh v. Cox.' 3 Plaintiff sued
defendant in tort for the full amount of damages done by reason of defendant's negligence to plaintiff's automobile. At trial, which took place
after the statute of limitations had run on the claim, plaintiff was permitted to amend her petition by adding to the caption, after her own
name, the conjunctive "and" and the name of her insurer, and in the
body thereof a factual allegation of the subrogation and the extent thereof
The Supreme Court upheld the trial court in granting permission of
the insurer to join as plaintiff after the statute of limitations had run.
Analyzing correctly, we think, the earlier cases of Cleveland Paint & Color Co. v. Bauer Manufacturing Co.' 4 and National Retailers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Gross,15 the court held (1) that the insurer was not barred
by the statute of limitations from joining the insured after the statute had
run in the action against the tort feasor; (2) that the assignor and assignee may be compelled by the defendant to join if defendant makes
timely request for such protection; (3) that the daim for the damage is
one "indivisible chose in action" and that if the injured plaintiff wishes,
and neither his assignee nor the defendant objects, he may sue in his own
name for the full amount of damage, even despite the "partial assignment." The "cause of action" was therefore the whole damage to the
automobile. The insurer's cause of action (for his interest in the damage) had been brought for him by his assignor within the statutory period, therefore there was no laches on the part of the insurer.
To this writer the unanswered question in Rush v. Maple Heights
begins to have an answer. If a claim for portions of damage to property
constitutes one indivisible cause of action, and if a claim for both personal injury and property damage constitutes one indivisible cause of
action, then these cases boil down to a rule that whatever the insurer's
portion may be, he is merely the beneficiary of a rule that he may sue
separately for his portion and the insured may sue separately for his portion, without violating the general rule against splitting causes of action
and thus harassing the defendant. Any portion of the total claim left
over after the insurer has sued for his part is still indivisible in the hands
of the unreimbursed insured and he must sue for all of it or be barred
of the rest by any partial recovery by him.
This poses one further question to the writer: if the insurer sues
separately for his portion of the damage to property, may the defendant
13.
14.
15.

Holibaugh v. Cox, 167 Ohio St. 340, 148 N.E.2d 677 (1958).
155 Ohio St. 17, 97 N.E.2d 545 (1951).
142 Ohio St. 132, 50 N.E.2d 258 (1943).
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insist that the insured join for his portion of the property damage and
the personal injury?
Other Problems of Parties
A somewhat different situation exists in the specialized field of the
will contest case. The statute 16 requires that all the devisees, legatees and
heirs at law of the testator, as well as all other interested persons, including the executor or administrator, be made parties. Failure to do so is a
jurisdictional defect, not subject to correction after the running of the
statute.17 The question usually before the courts is whether all such
parties have been named and joined, and in their correct capacities. 18
During the period covered by this survey two cases involving this
often complicated problem were decided by the Supreme Court. In Abbott v. Dawson,'9 all heirs at law, as well as the devisees and legatees
named in the will, and the executor, Dawson, were named defendants.
Dawson was named only as executor in the caption and body of the petition. In the precipe he was named, but not designated at all as to his
capacity, and in the summons he was again designated executor.
The Supreme Court distinguished Peters, Bynner and Mangan, in
which one or more parties had been interested in the case in more than
one capacity, but had been designated in only one, or had been named
individually, but not in the fiduciary capacities which they actually bore
to the case. It determined that the action to contest had properly been
brought within the time limited.
In Fletcher v. First National Bank20 the Supreme Court followed
Peters and Gravier v. Glutb.21 One heir at law was neither named nor
served within the six-months period, although it appears that others in
his class had been. No service by publication on decedent's "unknown
heirs" had been made.2 2 The majority held that the mandatory requirements had therefore not been met and the court had no jurisdiction to
proceed.
16.
17.
683
18.
872
19.
20.
21.
22.

OHmo REv.CoDE § 2741.02.
OIo REv. CODE § 2741.09; Peters v. Moore, 154 Ohio St. 177, 93 N.E.2d
(1950). Bynner v. Jones, 154 Ohio St. 184, 93 N.E.2d 687 (1950).
See cases cited note 17 and Mangan v. Hopkins, 166 Ohio St. 41, 138 N.E.2d
(1957).
167 Ohio St. 238, 147 N.E.2d 609 (1958).
167 Ohio St. 211, 147 N.E.2d 621 (1958).
163 Ohio St. 232, 126 N.E.2d 332 (1955).
Omo REv. CODE § 2703.24.
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Stewart and Herbert dissented, relying on the doctrine of Draher v.
Walters,23 viz., that timely service of summons on one legatee-defendant
is deemed commencement of the action as to those defendants of his class.

Mandamus - "Self-Help"
The extraordinary common law writ of mandamus lies to compel a
public official to perform a non-discretionary duty. Public bodies such as
municipal councils and boards of education frequently find it useful to
determine in a summary fashion the legality of acts proposed by them to
be undertaken, particularly with respect to bond and note issues. The
fiscal officer of the body refuses to sign and issue the securities, thus
presenting the question of their legal validity, which is then determined
by an action in mandamus brought by the board against 'its fiscal officer.
While admittedly contrived, such suits do present a justiciable controversy, and a quick and efficient determination of a question of general
public importance is achieved.
The Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Underground Parking Commis24
sion v. Alexander, Secretary-Treasurer,
quietly threw a high-explosive
bomb into this procedure. The legislature created an Underground Parking Commission for the purpose of constructing an underground parking lot beneath the State Capitol grounds. 25 The secretary-treasurer of
this commission is appointed by the commission and presumably may be
removed by it at will. The commission, pursuant to statute, proposed
the issuance of mortgage revenue bonds, and in order to establish beforehand the validity thereof, to make such bonds readily marketable, to protect prospective purchasers thereof and, incidentally, himself, the secretary-treasurer refused to perform certain ministerial duties of a preliminary
but necessary nature looking to the issuance and sale thereof.
Sua sponte raising the question, the Supreme Court denied a petition
for a writ of mandamus against him, basing its decision solely on the
ground that "if respondent will not perform those ministerial duties, the
commission can appoint a secretary-treasurer who will," and that "relator
has an adequate remedy by way of self-help."
The court, about five months later, in State ex rel. Board of Education
v. Thompson, Clerk,2 6 adhered to its decision in the underground park23.
24.
25.
26.

130 Ohio St. 92, 196 N.E. 884 (1935).
167 Ohio St. 359, 148 N.E.2d 500 (1958).
OHIo REv. CODE § 5538.02.
168 Ohio St. 93, 151 N.E.2d 359 (1958).
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ing case. It was pointed out to the court that it had in the interim between its two decisions decided another case involving an appointed and
27
removable fiscal officer without choosing to raise this particular issue,
but the court refused to change its course, pointing out -in its turn that
in the second case the petition -inmandamus had failed for another and
different reason to state a cause of action, upon which it had been possible for the court to base its refusal to issue the writ.
There is no doubt that in an extremely technical sense the court is
correct. To this writer it seems, in all due respect, that the court is, as
Professor Bohlen once said in another situation, carrying a good joke too
far. First of all, the court has -been deciding such cases for years without
ever raising the issue of the disposable fiscal officer. Second, the court
overlooks the fact that the questions posed in such actions are real issues,
not the least bit feigned, and they are of vital importance to the development of communities and the construction of needed -improvements, requiring quick solutions. Third, while technically subject to being answered in other kinds of judicial proceedings, such as actions for declaratory judgments commenced in courts of first instance and appealed
ultimately to the Supreme Court, these other solutions are not in fact adequate, in view of the length of time involved, while the taxpayer's suit to
restrain the issuance of the securities is equally protracted. The legislature could, of course, amend the statutes so as to make the fiscal officer
of such bodies as boards of education not removable at the pleasure of the
body, but whether this is otherwise desirable is at least doubtful. The
result is that the court has in effect dictated legislative policy.
It is submitted that the possibility of self-help and the adequacy of the
remedy -here are illusory. It is also submitted that perhaps the legislature
should provide parking spaces for the automobiles of Supreme Court
members somewhere up off North High Street - say up around the
Union Station, and then have the Underground Parking Commission refile the action.

Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem for Minor Defendant
The law presumes that minors do not have the capacity to prosecute
and defend civil actions, and requires, for the former, the bringing of
such suits by the father or next friend and for the latter, the defense
thereof by a guardian ad Iitem. 28 Appearances are often deceiving, and
27. State ex rel., Board of Education v. Crandal, 167 Ohio St. 399, 149 N.E.2d
163 (1958).
28. Omo REv. CODE §§ 2307.11, 2307.16.
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a plaintiff may have no knowledge of the fact that the person whom he
makes a defendant is not of full age. In fact, it occasionally happens that
a plaintiff does not disclose to his attorney the fact of his minority. In
Canterbury v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. 29 the minority of the plaintiff apparently remained unknown to counsel and the court until after the impaneling and swearing of the jury and the presentation of testimony by witnesses, including part of her own testimony. The Supreme Court held
that no prejudice to any substantial right of defendant occurred when at
that point the trial court granted plaintiff leave to amend her petition
by interlineation by inserting the name of her husband as next friend,
to allow him to verify and refile the petition and to proceed as though
the case had been commenced by the next friend.
Certain other considerations may be present when the situation is
reversed by the fact that the defendant is a minor. In Ritzler v. Eckleberry3" this fact seems to have been known to the plaintiff's attorney, for
he procured service of process on the defendant as a minor. An answer
in the form of a general denial was verified by the defendant but neither
party ever procured the appointment of a guardian ad litem or the filing
of any answer by such party. Plaintiffs adduced their evidence and rested,
whereupon defendant testified in his own behalf as to the facts of the
case and as to his minority as of the time of trial. Both parties rested,
defendant made a motion to discharge the jury on the ground of his
minority and the failure to appoint a guardian ad litem, and plaintiff
moved the court appoint such a guardian and that his answer be filed
instanter. Plaintiff's motions were granted, the guardian was appointed
and a proper answer filed by him, whereupon the case was submitted to
the jury, which rendered a verdict for plaintiff.
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the trial court's actions. The
failure to appoint the guardian is an irregularity, but it was cured in this
case in that by the time any binding decree was entered the infant was
properly represented. Likewise, the thorough defense by the minor and
his own attorneys had prevented any but the most technical prejudice.
Left unanswered is the question whether the result would have been
the same if the corrective action had not taken place until after verdict
and judgment. Likewise, it probably must be assumed that a different
result is possible if no service is had on the infant's guardian or next
3
friend. '
29.
30.
31.
467

158 Ohio St. 68, 107 N.E.2d 115 (1952).
167 Ohio St. 439, 149 N.E.2d 728 (1958).
OHIO RaV. CODE § 2703.13; Russell v. Drake, 164 Ohio St. 520, 132 N.E.2d
(1956).
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Verification of Pleading
After Statue of Limitations Had Run
In Sellers v. Williams3 2 the Court of Appeals from Athens County
held that a verification of a petition required by Section 2309A6, Revised Code, may not be supplied by amendment after the statute of limitations has run. The petition on motion will be stricken from the files and
the case is then out of court. In so ruling the court followed two old
33
common pleas and district court decisions

Reference of Divorce Cases
We commented in a previous survey article34 on the reiteration of
the rule that the statutes pertaining to divorce proceedings require the
court to try a petition for divorce and forbid reference to a referee3 5
During the period covered by this survey there were published two opinions of different courts of appeals which had before them the question
whether ancillary matters such as permanent custody of minor children of
the marriage could be referred. The Court of Appeals of Mahoning
County held that the words, "hearing any of the causes for divorce' as
used in Section 3105.10, Revised Code, includes hearing evidence as to
the custody of children.36 A few weeks later the Court of Appeals for
Franklin County, without citing Rider held87 that Section 3105.10 does
not require the court to hear the case "in ancillary matters which may
arise out of the divorce proceedings" and that a hearing on custody before a referee was proper. In both cases the divorce had already been
granted, so that there seems to be an irreconcilable conflict. Motion to
certify in the latter case was denied.

Power of Sale Under An Attachment
In 1949 plaintiff filed a petition against defendant seeking a money
judgment and costs. While the opinion of the Court of Appeals of
Hamilton County s does not say so in so many words, it appears that
plaintiff's cause of action was purely in parsonam. It is likewise unclear
32. 152 N.E.2d 299 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957); See also Sanger v. Gross, 142 N.E.2d
263 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
33. Stevens v. Wlhite, 1 W.L.M.394, 2 Ohio Dec. Rep. 107 (1859); Boyles v.
Hoyt, 2 W.L.M. 548, 2 Ohio Dec. Rep. 376 (1860).
34. 8 WEsT.REs.L. REv. 268 (1957).
35. OHIo Ruv. CODE § 3105.10.
36. Rider v. Rider, 152 N.E.2d 361 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
37. Hebden v. Hebden, 153 N.E.2d 150 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
38. Horn v. Larnblin, 106 Ohio App. 215, 150 N.X.2d 316 (1957).

